Interview: Errol Babacan
The ideological outlines of the AKP’s neoliberal hegemonic project have been shaped in response to two political challenges. Radical Islamism has been pacified whereas the conflict with the Kurdish movement is still the most serious dynamic of crisis. After the failure of the “democratic opening” to eliminate the influence of the Kurdish movement, the forcible abolition of the latter appears to be the only way for the realization and success of the hegemonic project.
Let us begin with a question regarding the relation between Political Islam and nationalism. We are often confronted with the idea that Political Islam is formulating an alternative to nationalism. Is it plausible to consider Political Islam as a break vis-à-vis nationalism in Turkey?
Cenk
Saraçoğlu (CS): In
order to provide a plausible answer to this question first of all we need to emphasize
a unique characteristic of nationalism. As opposed to various other ideologies,
the power of nationalism lies in its being amenable to be articulated to other
ideological projects. I use the term articulation here in reference to Ernesto
Laclau who defines it as “any
practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is
modified as a result of the articulatory practice”. Put it more clearly, thanks
to its flexible ideational framework, nationalism can be incorporated into
other ideologies depending on the hegemonic struggles in a society. Through its
every articulation, nationalism could be a part of or serve different
ideological or social projects and hence its meaning and nature could change or
“its identity could be modified”.
Therefore, one cannot say
that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between any general ideology and nationalism. This holds especially true
in the realm of political practice where there were ample historical examples
of nationalism being incorporated into conservatism, liberalism, racism etc.
Even in certain historical contexts, we witnessed the incorporation of
nationalism into socialism, although the class-based conception of the latter
is indeed theoretically anathema to such a “homogenous” construction as nation
which is designed to supersede class contradictions and conflicts.
Taking these explanations
as a
point of departure, I can say that it would be misleading to conceive Political
Islam or Islamism as trans-historical competitors of nationalism per se.
Depending on the historical circumstances, the course of class relations and
ideological struggles in a society nationalism and Islamism can be incorporated
into each other, provided that such an incorporation would be conducive to the
realization or consolidation of a political or hegemonic project.
Let’s relate this to Turkey. Political
Islam, more specifically the Justice and Development Party AKP, appeared to be
a historical chance to overcome Turkish nationalism. When we evaluate the ideological outlook of this party today:
has such an expectation proved well-founded? What kind of ideological project
does the AKP stand for?
CS: To answer this question, it is very important to go
back to the conditions of the year 2002 when the AKP won the national elections
and came to power. The 2002 elections were held in a period when the neoliberal
economic transformation in Turkey was undergoing a deep crisis of hegemony.
This crisis had political and ideological as well as economic manifestations. The
never-ending economic crises, the increase in unemployment and economic instability
created deep grievances on the part of large sections of society. On the side
of the working class but also on the side of some sections of bourgeoisie, which
have been negatively affected by sudden devaluations. There was a growing
discontent with the market economy and neoliberal institutions. And there was a
growing political distrust in the traditional political actors.
It was a time when it was quite difficult to win the
consent of working people to the existing political order. The official
ideology - i.e. Kemalism - was of no avail to this crisis of hegemony, especially
in the presence of such longstanding challenges as radical Islamism and the Kurdish
movement.
It was in such a conjuncture that the AKP won the
elections and came to power as a brand new party promising change and stability
to its electors. It was obvious that such a promise could not be fulfilled
without a large-scale transformation of political and ideological structures;
which meant constructing a new hegemonic project that could re-establish the
broken ties between people and the system. The contours of this hegemonic
project have been shaped in process. Today it took such a solid form that we
can identify distinctive features.
What
is new about this hegemonic project?
CS: It is neoliberalism again under a new hegemonic
strategy.
Cihan Tuğal refers to this process as a passive
revolution[1];
and this concept is quite useful to get to grips with the nature of this
transformation. The transformation undertaken by the AKP is radical on the one
hand as it creates drastic changes in the political and ideological levels of
society; but at the same time this is a passive
revolution because rather than overcoming or at least modifying neoliberal
economy it attempts to reconstruct and revitalize it in a new political and
ideological context.
Concerning the question about the novelty of this
project, one can put emphasis on different dimensions of change. I would like
to primarily focus on the ideological restructuring. By ideological
restructuring I mean the transformation in the ideas, symbols and sentiments
used to manufacture the consent of the people to ongoing neoliberal economic system in Turkey.
What we see in the AKP
case in regard to the ideological restructuring is an articulation of Islamism
and nationalism which constitutes a coherent and in my opinion a historically
specific ideological formation, which I refer to as “Islamic-conservative
nationalism”.
Is
it still valid to call it nationalism although it seems to be based on religion
instead of ethnicity?
CS:
It sounds
contradictory but this is exactly its distinctive feature. It is a form of
“nationalism” and hence it shares some essential features of “generic”
nationalism. Like all nationalisms, the AKP’s Islamic-conservative nationalism relies
on the following premises: A nation, which is the imagination or construction
of people living in a defined territory as “nation”; a “national identity” based
on an invented or a real commonality; a “national history” which construes a
common past; as well as the notion of a “national interest”, which means that
the people forming the nation have some common interests that transcend
individual or sectarian interests.
What is distinctive in the Islamic-conservative
nationalism is that Islamism and conservatism have an overwhelming effect in
construing and shaping these common elements of nationalism. In other words, Islamism
and conservatism provides symbolic content for and to a large extent determines
the referents of the notions of the mentioned elements of nationalism. This is
what makes Islamic-conservative nationalism very different from Kemalist
nationalism which had long served as the official ideology of the Turkish
state.
Before pointing out the difference to Kemalist
nationalism: what’s the difference between Islamic-conservative
nationalism and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which has been promoted as state
policy especially after the coup d’etat in 1980?
CS:
The major goal of Turkish-Islamic synthesis was to combine Turkishness
itself with some common elements of Muslimhood. Here the major discussion was
about how to make the idea of Turkism compatible with Muslim identity. As the
word “synthesis” itself suggests, it perceived Turkishness and Muslimhood as
two separate notions that need to be integrated in such a way as to make
Turkish nationalism more appealing in the society. What we see in Islamic-conservative
nationalism is not the synthesis of two historically different identities or
sentiments. Rather we witness a redefinition of the nation itself, along the
lines of predominantly Islamist and conservative elements.
“Turkishness” or
“Turkism” is not considered as an independent and overwhelming element in the
formation of national identity. Islamism and conservatism determine to a large
extent what the AKP means by “nation” and accordingly Turkishness is relegated
to the status of a demographic component of nation. Recently, however, we
observe some attempts especially from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to
emphasize Turkishness in order not to lose the support of those whose major
concern is the rise of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party PKK and in order to attract traditional MHP
votes to his power[2].
This should be seen as a pragmatic strategy of garnering the support of Turkish
nationalists for the approaching presidency elections. It does not change the
fact that at the core of the AKP’s hegemonic project and its ideology is not a
Turkish-Islamic synthesis but Islamic-conservative nationalism.
To get a more concrete idea of the difference to
Kemalist nationalism: could you point out the particular elements of Islamic-conservative
nationalism?
CS: Official Kemalist nationalism defined the nation in quite different forms ranging
from territory and citizenship to race and ethnicity. In all its forms,
however, “nation” was a secular entity portrayed as a single organic cultural
unit. The national identity was defined in reference to Turkishness.
Turkishness was thought as a melting pot in which non-Turkish Muslim ethnic
groups in Turkey could be assimilated and integrated into a homogenous “Turkish
nation”.
In Islamic-conservative nationalism, “nation” refers
to people living within the borders of Turkey and sharing some common cultural
and religious beliefs and practices. These common cultural values are typically
referring to a Sunni interpretation of Islam: Islamic conservatism. Turkishness
was redefined here in such a way that it started to refer to an ethnic identity
existing side by side with other ethnic identities such as Kurds, Circussians,
Georgians etc. The importance of the Turkishness in defining the national
identity was downplayed and replaced by a common culture defined along the
lines of Sunni Islam.
In reference to the national history, Kemalist
nationalism either addresses the foundation of Turkish Republic as the origin
of nation or traces this genesis so far back as to ancient Anatolian
civilizations. But in no interpretation of Kemalist nationalism one can see the
Ottoman past as the primary marker of the “nation”. The contrary is the case
for Islamic-conservative nationalism, though. In this nationalist ideology,
“the nation” is supposed to take its form in the Ottoman times and the current
society living within the borders of Turkey is the descendant of Anatolian
Muslims living in the Ottoman period.
So to put, in my opinion Political
Islam provided a new ground for nationalism to reanimate itself in Turkish
society, albeit in the context of a new kind of hegemonic project. It contributed
to the revitalization of nationalism and nationalist feelings in its Islamic
conservative form in a social context where the Kemalist form of Turkish
nationalism was in crisis and of no avail to come up with an alternative to
overcome the crisis of hegemony that reached its zenith in the early 2000s.
This
brings us back to the argument that Islamic-conservative nationalism emerged in
response to two political and ideological challenges, radical Islamism and
Kurdish nationalism. I would like to go into the Kurdish question which is also
a major part of your research interest. Which role did the Kurdish question
play for the emergence of this new hegemonic project?
CS:
Overall, the
hegemonic project aimed to repair the depreciated bonds between state and
people with a new ideology. Especially the emphasis on Ottoman glory was
important to boost people’s self-confidence that had been impaired during the
1990s and the early 2000s as a result of economic crisis.
The
AKP’s emphasis on Sunni-Islamic values and its critique of Kemalist institutions
as well as the rigid secularism tamed the challenge of radical Islamism,
pacified radical Islamists and integrated them into its hegemonic project. This
is roughly to what Cihan Tuğal refers while discussing passive revolution.
In
regard to the Kurdish question, something similar can be identified: Islamic-conservative
nationalism provided the state with a new strategy of dealing with the Kurdish
challenge. The disengagement of the definition of nation from Turkishness and
ethnicity enabled the AKP to recognize the presence of Kurdish ethnicity and invite
the Kurds to its Islamic-conservative hegemonic project.
But other than the challenge
of radical Islamism, which seems to be pacified, the recognition of Kurdish
ethnicity under the AKP’s rule doesn’t seem to facilitate a resolution of the
conflict. On the contrary, we experience an extreme militarization that is
reminiscent of the 1990s. We have also very recently seen how the AKP
introduces coercive measures to intimidate democratically elected Kurdish
politicians and imprison them together with many thousands of activists. Many
Kurds obviously don’t accept this invitation, and the authoritarian-kemalist
policies are again put into practice. How do you evaluate this development, as
a collapse or a regression?
CS:
Many people see
the AKP’s current Kurdish policy as a shift in this party’s approach, which -
in its first years - had looked more democratic and reformist and more akin to the recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey.
In this perspective, the AKP adopted a more libertarian approach epitomized by
the so-called “Kurdish opening” project; according to this approach it even
tended to recognize the Kurdish identity and was ready to grant some rights and
freedoms to the Kurdish population; and yet, this approach says, it jettisoned
such a “courageous and path-breaking” approach and took up a more authoritarian
character of the traditional Turkish state which
manifested itself with the
current militarization.
I would argue here that despite the continuities in
the tactics and methods used to suppress the Kurdish movement, it would be
misleading to identify the AKP’s Kurdish outlook as a simple manifestation of
the traditional mentality of the Kemalist Turkish state. In the presence of the
described radical transformations observed in the realm of ideologies in Turkey,
I think, the AKP’s recourse
to military measures possesses
a qualitatively different character than the militaristic measures used before.
I would go even so far as to argue that it would be
more illuminating to seek a continuity not between the Kemalist state and the
AKP policies today, but rather in the seemingly more democratic policies of the
AKP in its earlier periods and its current authoritarian face. More concretely,
I would like to say that the democratic opening project that the AKP introduced
4-5 years ago is not in contradiction but in consonance with recent
militaristic measures. Rather than a deviation from the so-called democratic
opening and recognition-oriented reforms, the military measures in use today constitute
a complementary part and even a necessary element of the AKP’s seemingly democratic
opening.
It
still sounds odd and contradictory to talk about a project of recognition and
opening of a party which is identified as right-wing and nationalist and which
is politically responsible for the detaining of thousands of legal activists
and civilians.
CS: The AKP’s nationalism and its right-wing position represent
an unparalleled position in the realm of ideologies in Turkey. The Islamic-conservative
nationalism of the AKP and the vision of nation emanating from this sort of
nationalism is of a specific nature that allows the recognition of the Kurds in
Turkey as a separate ethnic group and the acknowledgement of such recognized
Kurds’ certain cultural rights. At least, at the discursive or propaganda
level, the AKP radically criticizes the Kemalist assimilationist and denialist
project and overtly mentions and recognizes the presence of Kurdishness as a
separate ethnic group. This also reflects on some political reforms, such as
the enactment of a state-sponsored Kurdish TV channel or the recognition of
Kurdish language courses as elective courses in the state schools, which were
quite inconceivable in and at odds with former Kemalist hegemony.
The
AKP received many support for these “path-breaking” measures, but now it seems
to lose the support of the Kurdish population…
CS:
We should
remember that in the AKP’s discourse and strategy, this recognition goes hand
in hand with a sweeping critique of Kemalism; and through such a critique the
pious/religious sensitivities of Sunni-Turkish population and the Kurdish
demands for recognition are being tied to each other to form a common Sunni
bloc against Kemalist past. This is to say that by situating the recognition of
the Kurds within an anti-Kemalist discourse, the AKP has attempted to create a
common bond or a common cause to integrate both Turkish and Kurdish
Sunni-religious sections of society under its hegemony. This worked to a
certain extent but it couldn’t break the influence of the Kurdish Movement on
the long run. Both in the 2009 municipality elections and the 2011 general
parliamentary elections, the Kurdish movement increased its strength as opposed
to the expectations of the AKP. It is telling here that the AKP officials
identify the BDP as the “Kemalists of the Kurds”![3]
However, criticizing the AKP’s reforms as insufficient
or irrelevant to Kurdish demands is one thing; but no one can deny that these
practices point to a shift in the strategy of the state to deal with the Kurdish
problem. This was something impossible for the Kemalist conception of Turkish nationalism
and Turkish “nation”.
Are
these kind of recognition attempts really so unique? For example, the former right-wing
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel called for recognition of the Kurdish reality
in the early 1990s, at the same time the social democratic party SHP had built
an election coalition with Kurdish politicians.
CS: Such seemingly “historical” steps could not go beyond
sporadic manoeuvres held in the critical phases of the struggle between the
Kurdish movement and the Turkish state. They did not become a constitutive
component of a redefinition of nation and nationalism. They did not emerge as a
result of an attempt to forge a radical transformation of official ideology.
What makes the AKP different from some other right-wing
parties in Turkey is its attempt to transform the official ideology on the
basis of the party ideology; and hence narrow down the gap between the ideology
of the party and the state. It is this point that makes ideological
transformation under the AKP very important in order to understand its new
conception in relation to the Kurdish question.
As Turkishness is losing its centrality in the
construction of nation and is relegated to a secondary status vis-à-vis the
Sunni-Islamic values, the AKP is able to recognize the Kurdish identity not as
a national identity per se but as a cultural sub-group of the nation constructed
along the lines of Sunni-Islamic values which are common to both Turks and
Kurds. Moreover, the perpetuation and sustainability of Islamic-conservative
nationalism is dependent on the
recognition of Kurdish identity. In the sense that only when the majority of
the Kurds attach themselves to this project, thanks to the temptation of
recognition, such vision of nation could be consolidated also in the rest of
Turkey. This is because any “separatist” or “nationalist” current gaining
popular base among the Kurds subverts the cogency and reliability of Islamic
conservative vision of nation. The resurgence of a competing Kurdish national
identity could also incite the emergence of a more reactionary and ethnicist
understanding of Turkish nationalism, an implicit threat to the Islamic-conservative
nationalism. After the failure of the “Kurdish opening” to eliminate the
influence of the Kurdish movement, the AKP is currently faced exactly with this
problem.
To put it very clearly, this is not the recognition of
the Kurds as a nation with self-determination; this is the recognition of their
cultural and ethnic difference. In this respect, the AKP’s recognition of
Kurdish identity and its nationalist motto “one nation, one flag, one state” is
not in contradiction but in harmony with each other, since, here, nation is
conceived as a Sunni-Islamic community comprising different ethnic-sub groups.
That is why in some other occasions Recep Tayyip Erdoğan added another element into
this motto: one religion. One religion guarantees “one nation including
different ethnic identities” and hence renders the recognition of Kurdishness
as a cultural sub-group unproblematic.
The
success of Islamic conservative solution to the Kurdish question, absorbing the
Kurds into the AKP’s “nation”, could only be adequately achieved when the
influence of the Kurdish movement is confined?
CS:
Yes. The reason
for this is that a powerful Kurdish movement in the Kurdish region of Turkey
impairs the ideological penetration of the AKP into the Kurdish population.
Two historical features of the Kurdish movement pose a
great obstacle to the AKP’s project on Kurds. The Kurdish movement has a
secular and left-wing orientation providing a secular worldview and a secular
perception of Kurdishness, especially for the Kurdish youth, which limits the
influence of Islam among the Kurds. And the Kurdish movement construes the
Kurdishness not as a mere “ethnicity” but as a nation per se with certain
interests and rights, a pretension which collides with the AKP’s recognition of
the Kurds as an ethnic variety.
So what we see today is two irreconcilable conceptions
of Kurdishness as well as an irresolvable contradiction between two different
visions of nation. The AKP is seeking for “one nation” comprising Kurds and
Turks as different ethnic groups; here Kurdishness can not constitute any
political category of action but can only remain as a folkloric component of
“nation”. For the Kurdish movement, however it is obvious that Kurdishness
refers to a political and national category. Therefore, in my opinion, a strong
Kurdish movement and the AKP with such a politically ambitious agenda cannot
coexist peacefully. In the eyes of the AKP the forcible abolition of the
Kurdish movement appears to be the only way for the realization and success of
the hegemonic project.
Today, the prolongation of the conflict in the region
is the most serious dynamic of crisis for the hegemony of the AKP because this
also has the potential to weaken the cogency of such vision of nation in the
entire Turkey. At that moment, it is quite likely for the AKP to compensate
such ideological weakening with more authoritarianism all across Turkey.
The
outcome of your analysis is then that under the given power relations a political
and peaceful resolution of the conflict within the existing borders of Turkey is
fading away rapidly. Moreover, taking into account the uncompromising attitude
of the ruling party and the never-ending violent attacks against Kurds in many
parts of the country, the separation of Turks and Kurds seems to become
inevitable.
CS:
Despite the increasing
militarization of the conflict and the ascending polarization between Kurds and
Turks in Turkey, I think, as socialists, we should still insist on the idea of
building a free and equal country which recognizes the Kurds and Turks and all
other groups as equal citizens. I think socialists from both Kurds and Turks
have a historical responsibility to develop and assert an alternative to the
Islamic-conservative nationalism. Such a belated and seemingly obsolete task is
more than ever required at this juncture. If this sounds quite unrealistic at
this moment, this is because Turkish left is weakest ever in its all history
and has not enough power to wield a significant ideological and political
influence over Turkish society, let alone claiming for political power.
While the Kurdish movement is potent enough to assert
its own political vision and project in Middle East today, the same thing does
not hold true for socialist left in Turkey, a situation which obstructs the
development of a country-wide socialist alternative for the Kurdish and Turkish
working class. This also partly accounts for why the Kurdish movement is
oscillating between being an independent national movement in Middle East with
its own agenda and being a Turkey-based left-wing dynamic that could contribute
to the emancipatory transformation of Turkey.
Dr. Cenk Saraçoğlu is a social scientist at the Baskent University, Ankara. He is working on
migration, nationalism, urban transformation and ethnic relations with a
particular focus on Turkey. He is a member of the editorial committee of the Turkish
academic journal Praksis.
[1] Cihan Tuğal: Passive
Revolution. Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, Stanford 2009.
[2] The Nationalist Movement
Party MHP is an ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist party.
[3] The Peace and Democracy Party BDP
is overwhelmingly supported by the Kurdish population of Turkey. The accusation
of being Kemalist implies elitism, authoritarianism, laicism.